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Submission to Review of Termination of Pregnancy Laws 
Queensland Law Reform Commission 
 
Kate Galloway* and Jemima McGrath** 
 
1. Summary of Submission, answering Consultation Questions 
 
Q  Question Submission response Section  
Who should be permitted to perform or assist in performing terminations 
Q1 Who should be permitted to perform, or 
assist in performing, lawful terminations of 
pregnancy? 
As a medical procedure, qualified health 
professionals should be permitted to perform 
of assist in performing lawful terminations 
according to professional and clinical 
guidelines. 
§5 
Q2 Should a woman be criminally responsible 
for the termination of her own pregnancy? 
No. §4 
Gestational limits and grounds; Consultation by the medical practitioner 
Q3–10  Gestational limits and grounds; Consultation 
by the medical practitioner 
These are medical and clinical questions best 
dealt with through evidence-based clinical 
guidelines that inform medical practice, and 
not through the criminal law. 
§6–9 
Conscientious objection 
Q11–12  Should there be provision for conscientious 
objection? Are there any circumstances in 
which the provision should not apply? 
Should a health practitioner who has a 
conscientious objection be obliged to refer 
or direct a woman to another practitioner or 
termination of pregnancy service? 
There should be a qualified provision for 
conscientious objection, subject to an 
obligation: 
• to timely referral to a health care provider 
who will supply the health service;  
• to provide the service regardless if there 
is no other geographically proximate 
practitioner; and 
• to provide the service regardless in the 
case of emergency. 
§10 
Counselling 
Q13 Should there be any requirements in relation 
to offering counselling for 
the woman? 
This is a medical and clinical question best 
dealt with through evidence-based clinical 
guidelines that inform medical practice, and 
not through the criminal law. 
§9 
Protection of women and service providers and safe access zones 
Q14 Should it be unlawful to harass, intimidate 
or obstruct: 
(a) a woman who is considering, or who has 
undergone, a termination of pregnancy; or 
(b) a person who performs or assists, or who 
has performed or assisted in performing, a 
lawful termination of pregnancy? 
Yes §11 
Q15 Should there be provision for safe access 
zones in the area around premises where 
termination of pregnancy services are 
provided? 
Yes §11 
Q16 Should the provision: 
(a) automatically establish an area around 
the premises as a safe access zone? If so, 
what should the area be; or 
(b) empower the responsible Minister to 
make a declaration establishing the area of 
each safe access zone? If so, what criteria 
The provision should afford ministerial 
discretion as a flexible means of dealing with 
strategies from time to time of those who seek 
to harass, intimidate, or obstruct the provision 
or receiving of reproductive services.  
The guidelines to be followed in determining 
the extent of the safe access zone should 
§11 
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Q  Question Submission response Section  
should the Minister be required to apply 
when making the declaration? 
reflect principles of reproductive justice. That 
is, although they should through their 
operation protect women and those carrying 
out the relevant services, ministerial discretion 
to enact a safe access zone would remove the 
power imbalance between those seeking to 
harass, intimidate, or obstruct, and the women 
involved. The overarching rationale is that 
failing to enact a safe access zone allows for 
circumstances that will prevent women from 
exercising their bodily autonomy 
Q17 What behaviours should be prohibited in a 
safe access zone? 
Behaviours that may have the effect of 
harassing, intimidating, or obstructing a 
woman seeking reproductive health services 
or a person providing those services; and any 
activity designed to deter a woman from 
seeking reproductive health care at the facility 
associated with that safe access zone, or to 
deter a person providing those services 
entering the health care facility; and attempts 
to disseminate a view on reproduction in a 
safe access zone. 
§11 
Q18 Should the prohibition on behaviours in a 
safe access zone apply only during a 
particular time period? 
They should apply at all times. §11 
Q19 Should it be an offence to make or publish a 
recording of another person entering or 
leaving, or trying to enter or leave, premises 
where termination of pregnancy services are 
performed, unless the recorded person has 
given their consent? 
Yes §11 
Collection of data about terminations of pregnancy 
Q20 Should there be mandatory reporting of 
anonymised data about terminations of 
pregnancy in Queensland? 
Yes, subject to stringent data collection and 
dissemination requirements to ensure that a 
woman’s identity cannot be reconstructed 
from the data. 
§12 
 
2. Focus and Definitions 
2.1. This submission recognises diversity in gender amongst those capable of becoming 
pregnant. While this submission uses ‘woman’ throughout, it acknowledges the 
experiences of those who do not identify as female. It recommends that the law 
surrounding termination of pregnancy be framed to ensure that it accommodates 
reproductive justice for all who are pregnant. 
2.2. This submission focuses on the empowerment of the self-determination of women to 
make decisions about their reproductive health as a hallmark of their equality as 
citizens. 
 
3. Criminal Responsibility for Pregnancy Termination 
3.1. In the liberal tradition embedded within Queensland’s system of governance, the 
autonomy of individuals is paramount.1 Autonomy manifests as various freedoms for 
the individual to determine their best life with minimal state intrusion. Yet the state 
itself determines the competence of individuals to exercise their freedoms. 
                                               
1 Derived from Enlightenment liberals eg: John Stuart Mill On Liberty (1859). See this in operation in Australian 
government, through assumption of a principle of limited governmental intrusion into private lives: Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General Joint Working Group, A Proposal for a National Model to Harmonise Regulation 
of Surrogacy (2009). 
 QLRC Review – Termination of Pregnancy Laws | Galloway & McGrath 3 
Paradoxically, the state intervenes in the most intimate of circumstances to constrain 
individual freedom2 yet in other areas is slow to afford protection against bodily 
incursions.3 This is notably the case in circumstances involving sex and gender.4 
3.2. Traditionally, and in accordance with social norms derived from a patriarchal order, 
the state has upheld a social and legal paradox whereby women are both autonomous 
citizens equal with men,5 while at the same time are incompetent to make 
autonomous choices about various aspects of their lives6—especially their bodies. 
3.3. The criminalisation of pregnancy termination is one such example. Underpinning the 
crime of procuring the termination of one’s own pregnancy is the assumption of 
women’s incompetence to exercise self-determination and autonomy in decisions 
about her bodily integrity.7 Once pregnant, the law constructs ‘woman’ as a different 
being8 and regulates her body accordingly. Morris and Nott point out that: ‘English 
law has denied personhood to the foetus, but tends to treat pregnant women as being 
in conflict, ie woman against foetus’.9  
3.4. This opposition is recognised in arguments about the gestational stage permitted for 
termination, which assume the priority of a foetus over the woman.10 
3.5. Opposition is implicitly embedded also where the interests and autonomy of the 
woman are considered as secondary to the interests of the state and other actors. 
Thus, the QLRC’s consultation paper prioritises the question of who should be 
permitted to perform or assist in performing an abortion11—rather than commencing 
with the question of whether a woman should suffer criminal sanction in making a 
decision about her own body.  
 
4. Decriminalisation and Reproductive Rights 
4.1. Abortion can be considered one aspect of women’s reproductive rights. To the extent 
that the law provides criminal sanction for a woman who procures termination of her 
pregnancy, such laws breach women’s reproductive rights as well as her bodily 
autonomy.  
4.2. Helpfully, London outlines four human rights principles underlying reproductive 
rights: 
4.2.1. Choice of whether and when to bear a child; 
4.2.2. Privacy of personal decisions about sexual intimacy and childbearing; 
4.2.3. Freedom from governmental interference in medical decisions made by 
an individual with her doctor; and 
                                               
2 Highlighted, for example, in Wolfenden Report Cmd. 247 (1957). 
3 See, eg, the law’s struggle to deal with systemic sexual harassment and abuse evidenced by what has become 
known as the #metoo movement globally: Jessalyn Keller, ‘#MeToo Campaign Brings Conversation of Rape to the 
Mainstream’ The Conversation (25 October 2017). 
4 Frances E Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ (1983) 96(7) The Harvard 
Law Review 1497. 
5 See, eg, Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). 
6 See, eg, Kate Galloway, ‘A Sense of Entitlement? The (Gender) Subtext of “Lifters not Leaners”’ (16 September 
2013) <https://katgallow.blogspot.com.au/2013/09/a-sense-of-entitlement-gender-subtext.html>; Kate Galloway, 
‘Ending Feminised Poverty’ (2014) 24(17) Eureka Street.  
7 See, eg, Katherine Kerr, ‘Queensland Abortion Laws: Criminalising One in Three Women’ (2014) 14(2) QUT Law 
Review 15, doi: https://doi.org/10.5204/qutlr.v14i2.540.  
8 Anne Morris and Susan Nott ‘The Law’s Engagement with Pregnancy’ in Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns (eds) 
Law and Body Politics: Regulating the Female Body (Dartmouth, 1995) 53, 55. 
9 Ibid 56. 
10 See, eg, ibid 42, [146]. 
11 Queensland Law Reform Commission, ‘Review of Termination of Pregnancy Laws’ Consultation Paper, WP No 
76 (December 2017), v, Questions 1 and 2. 
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4.2.4. Autonomy exercised through the freedom to make decisions about one’s 
body.12 
4.3. While not enshrined in law, the Queensland Parliamentary Committee on Surrogacy 
made recommendations based upon the concept of rights or freedoms to choose to 
have a child.13 Although couched in terms of ‘parents’ rather than women, this 
example illustrates the capacity of the law to comprehend the notion of reproductive 
rights. 
4.4. The core question to be answered by this Review is therefore whether a woman 
should suffer criminal sanction for procuring her own abortion. We submit that a 
woman should not be criminally responsible for the termination of her own 
pregnancy. The remaining questions are subsidiary to the woman’s right to be 
considered an agentic individual at law. 
 
5. Who Might Lawfully Perform Abortions and When 
5.1. Once the law accepts the woman as an autonomous citizen responsible for her bodily 
integrity, the question of abortion becomes a medical rather than a legal question. 
5.2. On the assumption that termination of pregnancy, whether surgical or medical, is a 
medical procedure, then subject to clinical recommendation as to expertise, it 
becomes subject to the same regulation as other medical procedures. This is a clinical 
question beyond the scope of this submission, but in any event, does not require 
specific provision within the criminal law which otherwise deals with assault and 
offences by unqualified persons. 
5.3. Further, clinical guidelines informed by medical ethics are best placed to dictate the 
circumstances of a termination, including as to: 
5.3.1. Gestational stage; 
5.3.2. Woman’s health;  
5.3.3. Foetal viability;  
5.3.4. Practitioner consultation; and 
5.3.5. Whether the termination is undertaken medically or surgically. 
5.4. Where medical practice is guided by norms of decision-making in the patient’s best 
interests and of harm-minimisation, it is appropriate for evidence-based clinical 
guidelines to inform practice, rather than the criminal law.14 
 
6. Reproductive Justice 
6.1. Merely enacting reproductive rights is not, however, sufficient to achieve 
reproductive justice. Thus, analysis of the extent to which the law might support 
reproductive rights, must consider the effect of power relations and differential 
resources.15 For example, one consistent effect of criminalisation of abortion is the 
                                               
12 Sarah London, ‘Reproductive Justice: Developing a Lawyering Model’ (2011) 13 Berkeley Journal of African 
American Law and Policy 71, 76. 
13 Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, Queensland Parliament, Report (2008), 18, 20. The Committee 
had been established to ‘investigate and report to the Parliament on the possible decriminalisation and regulation of 
altruistic surrogacy in Queensland’. The recommendations resulted in the enactment of the Surrogacy Act 2010 
(Qld). 
14 See eg, M Berer, ‘Making Abortions Safe: A Matter of Good Public Health Policy and Practice’ (2000) 78(5) 
Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 580; David A Grimes et al, ‘Unsafe Abortion: The Preventable 
Pandemic’ (2006) 368 The Lancet 1908, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69481-6; Lachlan J de 
Crespigny and Julian Savelescu, ‘Abortion: Time to Clarify Australia's Confusing Laws’ (2004) 181(4) Medical 
Journal of Australia 201. 
15 London, above n 12, 77. See also Barbara Baird, ‘Decriminalization and Women’s Access to Abortion in 
Australia’ (2017) 19(1) Health and Human Rights 197; L A Keogh et al, ‘Intended and Unintended Consequences of 
Abortion Law Reform: Perspectives of Abortion Experts in Victoria, Australia’ (2016) Journal of Fmaily Planning 
and Reproductive Health Care  doi: 10.1136/jfprhc-2016-101541. 
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likely availability of safe medical services to those who can pay, and the exclusion 
from safe medical services of those who cannot afford them.16 
6.2. Power relations and resources are relevant not only in achieving equality of access to 
safe abortion, but also in considering the context within which a woman makes a 
decision to terminate her pregnancy.  
6.3. The socio-economic determinants of health are well rehearsed.17 Where abortion 
becomes a health issue, a woman’s socio-economic circumstances therefore become 
relevant in making decisions about whether to proceed with a pregnancy. For the law 
to delimit circumstances that warrant termination18 will inevitably fail to comprehend 
the woman’s experience of her circumstances. By contrast, as a medical or clinical 
matter, the health practitioner is best placed to advise based on what is appropriate to 
the woman in her circumstances. 
6.4. However, in the case of termination of pregnancy, it is ill-conceived to make 
assumptions about socio-economic determinants of women’s health based upon 
standard demographic indicators such as place of domicile or household income. A 
woman whose outward appearance and location of her domicile might give the 
impression of access to financial means. However, as a consequence of gendered 
power dynamics within the household,19 she may not have access to sufficient 
economic resources to support a child, or to bear the costs of a termination. 
6.5. Specific to the reform of the law of termination of pregnancy, a framework of 
reproductive justice requires consideration of the effect of the law on the availability 
of relevant medical services to all Queensland women, including with reference to: 
6.5.1. Location of services; 
6.5.2. Age and therefore capacity to give consent to medical or surgical 
procedures;  
6.5.3. Access to relevantly qualified medical and allied health professionals;  
6.5.4. Privacy of service delivery; and 
6.5.5. Gender diversity in those who are pregnant. 
 
7. Location of Services 
7.1. As observed in the Consultation Paper, the majority of abortion services in 
Queensland are carried out by private providers. Consequently, terminations are 
relatively easy to access in many metropolitan areas, but are increasingly difficult to 
access in regional and in particular, in remote areas.  
7.2. To the extent that abortion is currently permitted under the law, the current system 
thus discriminates indirectly between metropolitan and regional women.20 
7.3. Decriminalisation of terminations so that they become a health matter, will facilitate 
provision within the existing health network including to regional and remote 
women. This change in focus will bring medical resources within the reach of all 
Queensland women. 
 
 
 
                                               
16 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, ‘Law of Abortion’ Final Report 15 (March 2008), Appendix One, 
[A28]; Caroline de Moel-Mandel and Julia M Shelley, ‘The Legal and Nonlegal Barriers to Abortion Access in 
Australia: A Review of the Evidence’ (2017) 22(2) The European Journal of 
Contraception & Reproductive Health Care 114, DOI: 10.1080/13625187.2016.1276162. 
17 See, eg, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Australia’s Health 2016, Chapter 4 ‘Determinants of Health’ 
<https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/australias-health/australias-health-2016/contents/determinants>.  
18 Such as those discussed in the QLRC Consultation Paper, 44–7. 
19 See, eg, as originally observed in Jan Pahl, Money and Marriage (MacMillan, 1989). 
20 de Moel-Mandel and Shelley, above n 16. 
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8. Age 
8.1. The question of capacity to give informed consent affects the law also. As the 
Consultation Paper points out,21 minors may be deemed capable of giving consent to 
a medical procedure. Where they are not, the Court may be asked to invoke its 
parens patraie jurisdiction to authorise the decision. 
8.2. In Queensland, the decision of Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service v Q 
[2016] QSC 89 (26 Apr 2016) highlights the need for reform in this area. Although 
the 12-year-old girl seeking a termination of her pregnancy was deemed capable of 
consenting to the procedure, the relevant authorities sought the imprimatur of the 
Court, which in turn ordered that the girl’s father be included in the decision-
making—against the girl’s express wishes that the father not be told.22  
8.3. The question is why this child was required to obtain a court order to secure medical 
attention, when surgery such as a tonsillectomy, or administration of drugs such as 
steroids or cancer drugs would not require the court’s permission.23 Involvement of 
the Court in this case adversely affected the girl, delayed her treatment and her 
suffering, and interfered with her bodily autonomy even as she was deemed to have 
capacity for self-determination. 
8.4. Decriminalisation of abortion, coupled with a therapeutic approach and bounded by 
the norms and laws concerning informed patient consent and self-determination, 
would necessarily avoid Court intervention in such circumstances. 
 
9. Access to Relevantly Qualified Professionals 
9.1. Related to location of services is access to relevantly qualified professionals. In terms 
of reproductive justice, this requires considering contexts beyond health services per 
se, to the professional mix required to ensure equity of access to abortion services. 
9.2. Notably, the Consultation Paper questions the need for counselling services as a 
prerequisite to obtaining a termination. As this submission identifies the need for a 
health-based approach rather than a legal approach, it does not propose mandating 
counselling as a pre-requisite. Instead, it suggests that counselling is a component of 
ensuring reproductive justice in terms of patient autonomy to make decisions about 
her own body, free from coercion that might occur within her social context. In other 
words, provision of relevantly qualified counsellors as integral to the process of 
offering advice to women seeking a termination, speaks to informed consent. 
9.3. In attempting to paint a pro-choice approach to abortion as anti-women, some 
(effectively) suggest that abortion is a patriarchal tool designed to prevent women 
from exercising reproductive freedom—ie in giving birth. This submission 
recognises that abortion is indeed a tool involved in women’s reproductive freedom. 
It might liberate women from the burdens of bearing, delivering, and raising a child 
as an expression of her bodily autonomy—but it might also be used as a tool of 
oppression where that woman desires to go ahead with her pregnancy.  
9.4. The possibility of abortion being used coercively is no reason to criminalise the 
practice. Instead, it is reason to ensure that women are in a position to give informed 
consent to the procedure upon obtaining qualified advice, including counselling. In 
particular, women experiencing pressure, domination, or violence need the 
opportunity to work through their concerns until they are able to make an informed 
decision. That decision may well reflect her coercive circumstances, but counselling 
                                               
21 Consultation Paper, 9. 
22 Heather Douglas and Caroline de Costa, ‘Time to Repeal Outdated Abortion Laws in New South Wales and 
Queensland’ (2016) 205(8) Medical Journal of Australia 1, doi: 10.5694/mja16.00807. 
23 Kate Galloway, ‘Abortion Before the Courts Again’ (2016) 41(2) Alternative Law Journal 138. 
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offers the opportunity to make the decision on her own terms in light of her social 
context. 
9.5. For this reason, the law should recognise, and clinical guidelines should reflect, that 
in light of gendered power dynamics and socio-economic determinants, consent to 
termination will in most circumstances be ‘informed’ where the woman has been 
afforded access to qualified counselling in reaching her decision. 
 
10. Conscientious Objection 
10.1. This submission recognises the moral stance of those who oppose abortion services. 
However, it submits that there is a balance to be achieved between the expression of 
such concerns and the autonomy of women seeking reproductive services. 
10.2. Reproductive justice will inevitably require the support of public health services, 
ensuring equality of access for women.24 This is one way to ensure that remote and 
regional women have access to health practitioners who do not hold conscientious 
objection to delivery of reproductive health services. 
10.3. In terms of individual practice however, in accordance with the underlying principle 
of women’s agency over their bodily autonomy and in particular in the case of 
emergency, there are four constraints on the exercise of conscientious objection. 
10.3.1. A health care provider cannot withhold reproductive services, including a 
termination, based on conscientious objection in an emergency where the 
woman’s life is in danger, or where there is a risk of grave harm to the 
woman. 
10.3.2. A health care provider cannot withhold reproductive services, including a 
termination, based on conscientious objection where there are no other 
geographically proximate services. This addresses the inequality of 
access to reproductive services experienced by remote and regional 
women.25 
10.3.3. A health care provider who conscientiously objects to providing 
reproductive services including termination, must refer the woman, in a 
clinically timely way, to another geographically proximate health 
provider that will provide the relevant service.26 
10.3.4. Further, conscientious objection should be limited to those directly 
involved in delivering health services and not those in ancillary 
positions.27 
10.4. Notably, other jurisdictions have provided for conscientious objection,28 
predominantly in non-emergency situations.  
 
 
                                               
24 See, eg, discussion in Ronli Sifris, ‘The Legal and Factual Status of Abortion in Australia’ (2013) 38(2) 
Alternative Law Journal 108. 
25 See, eg, Keogh et al, above n 15; de Moel-Mandel and Shelley, above n 16; Mridula Shankar et al, ‘Access, 
Equity and Costs of Induced Abortion Services in Australia: A Cross-sectional Study’ (2017) 41(3) Australia and 
New Zealand Journal of Public Health 309, doi: 10.1111/1753-6405.12641; Ronli Sifris, ‘A Woman’s Right to 
Choose’ in Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan (eds) Contemporary Human Rights Issues in Australia (Thomson 
Reuters, 2013) 251, 25; Victorian Rural Women’s Access to Family Planning Services Report (2012) 
<http://whv.org.au/static/files/assets/c6ba5133/Victorian-rural-womens-access-to-family-planning-services-survey-
report-August-2012.pdf>. 
26 See, eg, Termination of Pregnancy Law Reform Act 2017 (NT), s11. 
27 The House of Lords applied a test of proximity in considering who was entitled to conscientiously object under 
the Abortion Act 1967 (UK). It found that only those participating in the procedure had sufficient proximity to be 
excused based on conscientious objection. See Janaway v Salford AHA [1988] 3 All ER 1079. 
28 See discussion in, eg, Victorian Law Reform Submission, above, n 16. The Australian Medical Association did 
not support conscientious objection (at p114). 
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11. Privacy  
11.1. A component of reproductive rights, privacy in abortion law reform is relevant in a 
number of ways:  
11.1.1. privacy from state intervention (§4 above);  
11.1.2. privacy from others influencing the decision she makes in consultation 
with her health care providers (§9 above);  
11.1.3. privacy from grandstanding or harassment in the vicinity of the clinic; 
and  
11.1.4. privacy from dissemination of her name, image, or personal details in 
connection with any reproductive service.  
11.2. Questions 14–20 of this Review are relevant to the two latter forms of privacy. 
11.3. In the interests of effectively providing health care services to women seeking a 
termination, it should be unlawful to harass, intimidate or obstruct both a woman 
who is considering, or who has undergone, a termination of pregnancy; and a person 
who performs or assists, or who has performed or assisted in performing, a lawful 
termination of pregnancy. 
11.4. In recognition that decriminalisation of pregnancy termination is not of itself 
sufficient to provide access for women needing termination services, Victoria, 
Tasmania and the ACT29 have each enacted safe access zone legislation as a means 
of supporting women’s access to reproductive services. This submission supports the 
establishment of safe access zones. 
11.5. Rather than establish the extent of a safe access zone in legislation, this submission 
supports ministerial discretion as a flexible means of dealing with strategies from 
time to time of those who seek to harass, intimidate, or obstruct the provision or 
receiving of reproductive services. 
11.6. The guidelines to be followed in determining the extent of the safe access zone 
should reflect principles of reproductive justice. That is, although they should 
through their operation protect women and those carrying out the relevant services, 
ministerial discretion to enact a safe access zone would remove the power imbalance 
between those seeking to harass, intimidate, or obstruct, and the women involved.30 
The rationale is that failing to enact a safe access zone allows for circumstances that 
will prevent women from exercising their bodily autonomy. 
11.7. As to the extent of the safe access zone, the relevant considerations must reflect a 
balance between the harm done to the women in accessing health care services, and 
the intrusion into the lives of those prevented from carrying out their activities within 
that zone: it is the area reasonably necessary to ensure access to reproductive 
services. 
11.8. A principled approach to determining activities to be prohibited in the safe access 
zone would aim at any activity designed to deter a woman from seeking reproductive 
health care at the facility associated with that safe access zone, or disseminating a 
view on reproduction. In prosecuting her autonomy, a woman is entitled to access 
health services free from attempts to convince her otherwise. Those outside the 
relevant facility are not entitled to air their views in light of the availability of 
qualified health care expertise within the facility, and should be constrained by law 
from doing so. 
11.9. As a feature of reproductive rights, the privacy of women using or approaching the 
facilities extends to dissemination of their images, names, and personal details 
                                               
29 See, eg, Heather Douglas and Katherine Kerr, ‘Abortion, Law Reform and the Context of Decisionmaking’ (2016) 
25(1) Griffith Law Review 129, doi: 10.1080/10383441.2016.1201882. 
30 See, eg, Ronli Sifris, ‘State by State, “Safe Access Zones” Around Clinics are Shielding Women from Abortion 
Protesters’ The Conversation (30 November 2015) <https://theconversation.com/state-by-state-safe-access-zones-
around-clinics-are-shielding-women-from-abortion-protesters-51407>.  
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electronically or otherwise. Creation or dissemination of such details should 
constitute an offence.  
11.10. Ensuring a safe work environment for those providing health care services requires 
the same protection. Such provisions will also ensure that health care service 
provider staff can continue to carry out their work unmolested, ensuring continuity of 
service for women who need it. 
 
12. Collection of data about terminations of pregnancy  
12.1. Ensuring effective provision of reproductive services throughout the state requires 
data concerning the need for and delivery of such services. It is therefore appropriate 
to provide for collection of patient information but only where appropriate 
safeguards are incorporated. For example, anonymisation of patient records is 
imperative to ensure privacy both in terms of the possibility of reconstructing de-
identified information, but also to protect against the possibility of unauthorised or 
unintended leaks. 
12.2. Any data collection system must also cater for the likelihood of identification of 
patients in regional and remote areas. Such patients are likely to be readily 
identifiable with only minimal demographic information. 
 
